http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2010/711.html
DEFAMATION – admissibility of transcript of television broadcast
DEFAMATION – identification – application for dismissal of proceedings after conclusion of evidence for plaintiffs – whether there was evidence upon which the jury could decide that the matters complained of identified the second plaintiff
McCallum J
Transcripts of the broadcasts
3 The first issue was the admissibility of a transcript of each of the two broadcasts. There was already in evidence a recording of each broadcast on DVD. Ms Reid, who appeared with Ms Brown for the plaintiffs, noted that the jury would have those discs with them as exhibits in the jury room. She submitted, in effect, that it would make no difference for the jury also to have the transcripts and that they may be assisted by having them.
4 Different views have been expressed as to both the permissibility and the desirability of that course. In Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Limited v Parker (1992) 29 NSWLR 448, three judges of the Court of Appeal were in agreement that a transcript of a radio broadcast sued on in a defamation case should not be admitted into evidence where there is no difficulty in understanding the tape played before the jury: at 472G – 473E per Clarke JA, Cripps JA agreeing; per Handley JA at 474B. Clarke JA emphasised the general principle that the meaning drawn from a broadcast by the ordinary, reasonable listener or viewer (who sees it only once) is in many cases a matter of impression. In that context, his Honour saw force in the contention that a transcript could only have distracted the jury from their task of assessing the matter from that perspective.
5 Parker was decided before the commencement of the Evidence Act 1995. In Goldsworthy v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Limited (unreported 22 March 1999), Dunford J held that under s 48(1)(c) of the Evidence Act , both a tape of a radio broadcast and a transcript of it are admissible. However, his Honour saw “some difficulty in a transcript in that the provision of a written transcript of what was said may tend to mislead the jury into considering the material as if it were print media, eg a book or newspaper, rather than an oral broadcast”. On that basis, his Honour admitted the tape but exercised his discretion under s 135 of the Evidence Act to exclude the transcript.
6 In Vacik Distributors Pty Limited v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (unreported 4 November 1999), Sperling J took a different view. His Honour reached the same conclusion as had Dunford J that the transcript was admissible under s 48(1)(c) of the Evidence Act , subject only to the exercise of the Court’s discretion pursuant to s 135. The discretion to refuse to admit evidence under that section arises if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party, misleading or confusing or cause or result in undue waste of time.
7 Sperling J acknowledged that, where a tape of the broadcast is available and the only use for a transcript is as an aide-mémoire or for ease of reference, the transcript should not be regarded as having any significant probative value at all. On that basis, his Honour accepted that, if there was any significant unfair prejudice to a defendant of admitting a transcript, that prejudice “would necessarily substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence for the purposes of s 135”.
8 Sperling J was of the view, however, that the admission of a transcript did not entail prejudice of the kind perceived by Clarke JA in Parker. His Honour noted (as Clarke JA had) that much of what occurs at a trial in which a jury determines the question of defamatory meaning has a tendency to distract the jury from the task of assessing the effect of the broadcast at the time it was published, given that the ordinary reasonable viewer would have seen it only once. Sperling J concluded that an accurate transcript is an aid to that task, rather than a distraction from its proper performance.
9 Counsel informed me that the most recent substantive consideration of the issue is contained in the decision of Levine J in Griffith v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2003] NSWSC 483. In that case, Levine J came to a different conclusion (from that reached by Sperling J) as to the threshold question of admissibility. His Honour considered that, since the “best” evidence of the broadcast (a tape or a disc) is before the jury, there is no fact in issue to which a transcript of the broadcast can be relevant. On that basis, his Honour held (at [13]) that a transcript is not relevant evidence within the meaning of s 55 of the Evidence Act and, accordingly, that it is not admissible under s 56 of the Act. On that analysis, s 48(1)(c) of the Act did not assist.
10 Levine J stated further (at [14]), in case his primary analysis was wrong, that he would certainly exercise his discretion under s 135 so as to exclude the transcript. His Honour emphasised the importance of the concept of “impression” in relation to transient publications and did not agree with the analysis of Sperling J in Vacik that an accurate transcript is a proper aid to the jury’s assessment of that impression.
11 The conclusion reached by Levine J that a transcript of a broadcast is not “relevant” within the meaning of s 55 of the Act where a tape or disc recording of the broadcast is available to be put before the jury may be open to debate. Assuming the tape itself is admissible, it is probably a “document in question” as defined in s 47. On that basis, there may be force in the view expressed by Dunford J in Goldsworthy that a transcript of the tape is admissible by reason of the operation of s 48(1)(c).
12 However, it is not necessary for me to decide that question. Assuming for present purposes that the transcript is admissible, I would exercise my discretion under s 135 to exclude it, for the reasons explained by Clarke JA in Parker, by Dunford J in Goldsworthy and by Levine J in Griffith. In my view, there is a significant danger that the availability of a written version of a transient publication would compromise the already difficult task for the jury of assessing the likely impression of the publication on the viewer who saw it once, in its original form, as an ordinary, reasonable member of the community would see it.
13 Further, as noted by Levine J in Griffith at [11] (and accepted by Sperling J in Vacik), the probative value of a transcript is negligible where a tape or disc that can be understood is available to the jury. In my view, the probative value is plainly outweighed by the danger to which I have referred.
14 For those reasons, I rejected the tender of the two transcripts.